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OVERCROWDING IN PRISONS AND JAILS: MARYLAND
FACES A CORRECTIONAL CRISIS
Maryland's correctional facilities have in recent years become severely
overcrowded. The problem, now experienced in many states, has reached
crisis proportions and threatens serious disruption of the entire state
criminal justice system. By relying upon incarceration in dealing with
criminal offenders at a time when the state's facilities are incapable of
adequately housing those who are sentenced to confinement, the state's
criminal justice system is subjected to pressures which may subvert the
efficiency of the entire law enforcement process. This comment will focus
on the problem of overcrowding in Maryland's correctional facilities, its
causes, constitutional implications, and remedies, in the hope that a con-
cise statement of the problem may lend guidance to those whose duty it
is to solve it.
In per capita incarceration rate of adult state prisoners (not including
pretrial detainees), Maryland is said to rank second in the nation.1
One apparent reason for a high number of incarcerated convicts is the
current epidemic in crime, 2 but the high confinement rate may also be
explained by other factors. Since 1968 Maryland and particularly the
City of Baltimore have been receiving funds from the federal government
under the "Safe Streets Act."3 This money has enabled the state's law
enforcement agencies to modernize their equipment and training and
thus to increase the general efficiency and professionalism of the police.
While the crime rate has risen, so has the ability of the police to combat
crime, resulting in higher arrest rates. 4 Furthermore, over the past five
1. According to a study prepared by W. Donald Pointer, Deputy Secretary for
Correctional Services of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services, Maryland has 132.9 adult prisoners incarcerated in state correctional insti-
tutions for every 100,000 people in the general population, ranking second behind
Florida with 135.1. These figures are based on the 1970 census and a survey published
by the United States Department of Justice Bureau of Prisons in 1972. Another
study, prepared by the National Moratorium on Prison Construction and based on a
wider variety of more current sources, lists Maryland as ranking seventh in the nation
in overall incarceration rates. This calculation, unlike the Pointer study, includes all
adult and juvenile prisoners incarcerated in local jails and correctional institutions.
National Moratorium on Prison Construction (Washington, D.C.), New Bed Space
in Correctional Facilities, Cost, and Per Capita Detention Rates, Aug. 2, 1975 (on
file at the Maryland Law Review).
2. The incidence of violent crime in the United States rose forty-seven percent
from 1969 to 1974. FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 11 (1974).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-95 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973). For analysis
of the success of the funding mechanisms of these statutes, see Harman, The Bloc
Grant: Readings from a First Experiment, 30 PUB. AD. REv. 141 (1970); Stanley,
How Safe the Streets, How Good the Grant, 34 PUB. AD. REv. 380 (1974).
4. Interview with Richard W. Friedman, Director of the Mayor's Coordinating
Council on Criminal Justice in Baltimore, Nov. 7, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Fried-
man interview].
The Baltimore City Police Department reports that for the first nine months
of 1975 there was actually a 5.8 percent decrease in crime in Baltimore as compared
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years the average length of sentence in Maryland has increased by 39.7
percent. 5 This, coupled with a twenty percent increase over the last five
years in the number of convicts sent to the Maryland prisons," has resulted
in a constant increase in the number of people going into prison without
a similar increase in those being released. This imbalance could be much
worse, except that Maryland judges, aware of the severe overcrowding
problem, are sentencing only thirteen percent of convicted defendants to
incarceration in the Maryland Division of Correction.7 Another ten per-
cent are sentenced to local jails and the remaining seventy-seven percent
are given fines, probation, and suspended sentences.8
Maryland's Division of Correction has an effective bed capacity of
about 6,764 ;9 the prison population as of December 1, 1975, was 7161.10
The problem is now serious, but the projections for the future are more
alarming. From November 1, 1974, through December 1, 1975, the rise in
population indicated a yearly increase rate of 685.11 Even worse, for the
last six months of 1975, this rate increased to 1,013 per year.12 Con-
struction as now planned, including a new Reception, Diagnostic, and
Classification Center, a number of community corrections centers, and
redesign of existing facilities, could bring the effective bed capacity up
to about 8,500 by 1981.13 However, with an annual increase in prison
population of 685, by that time the state's correctional system will be
attempting to hold nearly 11,000 prisoners. By 1983, the shortage of beds
could exceed 4,000.14
with the same period in 1974. Baltimore Police Dep't Newsletter, Oct. 29, 1975, at 3.
Despite the apparent decrease in crime, arrests were up 11.2 percent. Id. The figures
probably indicate increased police efficiency.
5. See A. WILNER, COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS LEGISLATION (S.B. 418, H.B.
1105) 8 (Legislative Report to the Maryland General Assembly, Feb. 9, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as WILNER].
6. WILNER, supra note 5, at 7. The higher arrest rates have been a significant
factor in bringing about the increase in convicts sentenced to incarceration. Friedman
interview, supra note 4.
7. WILNER, supra note 5, at 8.
8. Id.
9. WILNER, supra note 5, at app. 5. Effective bed capacity is calculated by sub-
tracting from the total number of beds those reserved for handling transients in
transfer, housing during court trips, and "special confinement." In May of 1975, these
totaled approximately 206. DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONAL SERV., THE
POPULATION PROBLEM IN CORRECTIONS AND APPROACHES TO SOLUTION 6 (1975).
10. WILNER, supra note 5, at 5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. DEP'T OF PUBLIC SAFETY & CORRECTIONAL SERv., THE POPULATION PROBLEM
IN CORRECTIONS AND APPROACHES TO SOLUTION 2 (1975).
14. WILNER, supra note 5, at app. 5.
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The crush expected to hit the prison system is already being ex-
perienced by the state's local jails.'5 The Baltimore City Jail, for instance,
has a comfortable capacity of between 1,150 and 1,200.16 The present
population is approximately 1,900.17 Around eight hundred of these are
inmates who have already been convicted, but because there are no
available beds in the prison system the prisoners must remain at the
city jail.'8 The jail administrators are caught in a perplexing situation:
15. Generally the terms "prison" and "penitentiary" refer to post-conviction cor-
rectional institutions while a "jail" is taken primarily to mean a local pretrial detention
facility, although most jails also hold some convicts whose sentences are relatively short
16. Interview with Gordon Kamka, Warden of the Baltimore City Jail, in
Baltimore, July 2, 1975. The jail has 971 cells. Each cell measures five feet by eight
feet and is designed for single occupancy. In addition, there are two dormitories,
each with a capacity of 150 inmates. These dormitories are filled; rows of double
bunks are placed as closely together as possible to allow a minimum of space be-
tween them.
17. The Mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal Justice runs a weekly check
on the population of the Baltimore City Jail. Below are the results of the counts
taken on March 22, 1976, and September 7, 1976:
JAIL POPULATION
Percentage
of total
population Sept. 7 March 22 Change
1. Supreme Bench 24 464 520 -56
2. Federal ...................- 3 67 79 - 12
3. District Court ------------ 21 414 292 +122
4. Immigration 1 5 26 -21
5. Sentenced 6 121 116 +5
6. Sub-curia . . 4 72 70 +2
7. Held for Division of
Correction . . 41 793 526 +267
Total ----------- 100 1,936 1,629 +307
Hospital ------------ -34 -21 -13
Escape -- -9 -9 -
Actual Body Count ------- 1,893 1,599 +294
Memoranda prepared by Richard W. Friedman, Director of the Mayor's Co-
ordinating Council on Criminal Justice, March 22, 1976 and September 7, 1976.
18. The state pays the city on a per diem basis to compensate for the cost of
holding convicted prisoners at the City Jail until their transfer to the State Division
of Correction. In January of 1976, the bill had risen to $600,000. O'Donnell, The
Law-and-Order Legacy Leaves Maryland in a Tight and Expensive Predicament, The
[Baltimore] Evening Sun, Jan. 19, 1976, § A, at 14, col. 1.
It should be noted that the jail is also forced to house a number of federal
prisoners because of the lack of a federal detention facility in the Baltimore area.
See note 17 supra. Other localities experiencing equally serious overcrowding in
their jails are Prince George's County, Howard County, Montgomery County, and
Baltimore County. Howard County's one-hundred year old jail is so overcrowded
that some judges, it is reported, have simply refused to imprison many whom under
normal circumstances they would incarcerate. The [Baltimore] Evening Sun, Apr.
26, 1976, § C, at 1, col. 7.
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they cannot refuse to accept arrestees whom the police bring in, nor
can they release those who are sentenced to the state Division of Cor-
rection.
The problem of overcrowding in correctional institutions is by no
means peculiar to Maryland. The United States now has over a quarter
of a million convicted prisoners behind bars - the highest figure in our
history.'9 Overcrowding has brought about tremendous pressures on
correctional authorities in many states, particularly Arkansas,20 Alabama,21
Louisiana,22 Mississippi, 23 and Florida,24 parts of whose prison systems,
due largely to overcrowding, have been declared in violation of the
Constitution.
EFFECTS OF OVERCROWDING
To an administrator, an overcrowded prison or jail abounds in the
many day-to-day practical problems of inadequate facilities and manpower.
To a prisoner, however, overcrowding has a detrimental psychological
and sociological impact which in turn aggravates the administrative prob-
lems. It is widely accepted that unless humans have a certain amount of
physical space around their bodies, aggravation and stress result.2 5 This
territorial phenomenon is largely responsible for heightened tension in
prisons. 26 After a tour of the overcrowded District of Columbia Jail, one
expert stated:
Intrusion on personal space promotes aggression. So my conclusion
concerning the condition of the D.C. Jail is that virtually every possi-
ble step to promote the aggressive potential in prisoners has been
taken with utmost diligence.2 7
Prisoners' accounts of the pervasive atmosphere of violence at various
correctional institutions bear out the theories of the experts.28 Courts
19. Law Enforcement Assist. Adm. Newsletter, No. 7, Feb. 1976, at 5.
20. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971) ; Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
21. See James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
22. See Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970), order sub nora.
Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972).
23. See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
24. See Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd, 525
F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976).
25. See Griffith & Veitch, Hot and Crowded: Influences of Population Density
and Temperature on Interpersonal Affective Behavior, 17 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PsycH. 92 (1971); Calhoun, Population Density and Social Pathology, 1962 SCIEN-
TIFIC AMERICAN 206. See also R. ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966),
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1970).
26. See Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 27 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
27. Affidavit of Robert Ardrey, Campbell v. Magruder, Civil No. 1462-71
(D.D.C., filed Mar. 21, 1975).
28. See, e.x., McCray v. Sullivan, 399 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Ala. 1975).
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have also been sensitive to the danger of epidemic created by overcrowd-
ing. 29 There is even evidence that oppressive conditions in pretrial de-
tention facilities, such as those brought about by overcrowding, may
ultimately prejudice a defendant at his trial.3 0 Thus the studies and
evidence conclude with virtual unanimity that overcrowding in prisons
can be a serious health and safety problem, a conclusion raising many
questions about the legality of overcrowded correctional facilities.
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT
Until recently the judiciary has avoided an active role in correctional
administration. When called upon to order constructive changes or to
redress prisoner grievances, the courts have generally followed a "hands-
off" policy deferring all correctional matters either to the legislative or
to the executive branches.3 ' This policy was justified on several grounds:
1) courts lack expertise in the field of penology ;32 2) judicial intervention
might disrupt prison discipline;33 3) judicial involvement in correctional
affairs might precipitate a flood of litigation;34 4) the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers precludes judicial involvement;35 and 5) where federal
29. E.g., Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 27-28 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
30. See Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641 (1964);
Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Survey, Foreword,
39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631 (1964).
The appearance and demeanor of a man who has spent days or weeks in jail
reflects his recent idleness, isolation, and exposure to the jailhouse crowd. He is
apt to be unshaven, unwashed, unkempt, and unhappy as he enters the courtroom
under guard .... A judge's right to base findings of fact on witness demeanor
is unchallenged: is he immune from the same reflex action in sentencing?
Id. at 632.
31. For discussion of the hands-off doctrine, see Note, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72
YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
32. See Crothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (dictum).
See generally Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 175, 181-82 (1970).
33. See, e.g., Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). For
analysis of the problems experienced in California prisons as a result of increased
judicial involvement, see Comment, Judicial Intervention in Corrections: The Cali-
fornia Experience - An Empirical Study, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 452 (1973).
34. See Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Tamm, J.,
concurring). The fear appears to have been well-founded. With the demise of the
hands-off doctrine, the number of prisoner complaints filed in federal courts has in-
creased dramatically. In 1971, there were over 16,000 such actions, of which some
3,000 were civil rights complaints concerning prison conditions. FEDERAL JUDIcIAL
CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASE LOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT
12-13 (1972).
35. See United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 1965) ("The
federal prison system is operated in all its aspects by . . . the executive branch of
the government, and not by the judiciary.") (citations omitted) ; Powell v. Hunter, 172
F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Joyner v. McClellan, 396 F. Supp. 912, 916 (D. Md. 1975).
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courts deal with state prison matters, notions of federalism counsel
restraint.86
These traditional arguments have lost some of their persuasiveness
in light of the growing recognition of individual rights.8 7 In 1944, the
Sixth Circuit took the first major step in limiting the hands-off doctrine
holding: "A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except
those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." 8
Subsequent case law has modified and clarified this approach. The
Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez,9 although recognizing that many
of the traditional justifications for a hands-off attitude have validity,
concluded,
[A] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take
cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal
or state inztitution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a
fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge
their duty to protect constitutional rights.4"
36. See Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Shobe v. California, 362
F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 887 (1966); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290
F.2d 632, 640 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
37. See Millemann, Protected Inmate Liberties: A Case for Judicial Responsi-
bility, 53 ORE. L. REv. 29, 38-45 (1973); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A
Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J.
506 (1963).
Some of the justifications for the hands-off doctrine have been refuted by the
courts. It is often the cruel and arbitrary conduct of low-paid prison guards from
which relief is sought. It is hardly sensible that judges defer to their expertise. See
Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966).
But, we cannot, without defaulting in our obligation, fail to emphasize the im-
perative duty resting upon higher officials to insure that lower echelon custodial
personnel are not permitted to arrogate to themselves the functions of their
superiors. Where the lack of effective supervisory procedures exposes men to
the capricious imposition of added punishment, due process and Eighth Amend-
ment questions inevitably arise.
Id. at 141.
In Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d
392 (2d Cir. 1975), the court stated,
The failure in the past of legislators to take the proper correctional action to
remedy these inhuman conditions for both detainees and convicted prisoners has
eroded the historical reluctance of federal courts to interfere with the adminis-
tration of penal institutions.
Id. at 397 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court held in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961), that federalism does not preclude civil rights actions even when state
remedies have not been exhausted. But cf. Prieser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)
(An inmate's sole federal relief from the fact or duration of his confinement is habeas
corpus for which exhaustion of state remedies is a prerequisite).
38. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 887 (1945).
39. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
40. Id. at 405-06. See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969).
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In that case, the plaintiff inmates challenged the constitutionality
of a prison regulation authorizing extensive mail censorship. The Supreme
Court upheld the district court ruling, invalidating the regulation as a
violation of the first amendment. However, later that year in Pell v.
Procunier,41 the Court ruled that inmates' first amendment rights may be
limited in light of the state's legitimate objectives of rehabilitation and
maintenance of internal security. There, California prison inmates and
members of the news media challenged a prison regulation prohibiting
interviews between inmates and the press. The Court ruled that because
alternative means of communication were available, the legitimate cor-
rectional interests were sufficient to justify deferring to the expertise of
correctional officials and restricting the inmates' freedom to communicate.
Thus Pell somewhat modifies the holding of Procunier and may signal
a halt to the demise of the hands-off doctrine. Still, the Court held that
a prisoner "retains those First Amendment rights that are not incon-
sistent with his status as a prisoner or with . . . legitimate penological
objectives" 42 and pointed out that no such legitimate interests were present
in Procunier.43 The current status of the hands-off doctrine would there-
fore not seem to preclude litigation concerning the constitutionality of
prison conditions. 44
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OVERCROWDING IN PRISONS:
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The constitutional guarantee against "cruel and unusual punish-
ments '" 45 has expanded in recent years to provide prisoners a basis for
relief not only from specific acts of cruelty but from generally poor prison
conditions as well. The provision finds its roots in .the English Declara-
tion of Rights of 1689.46 Although there is persuasive historical evidence
41. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
42. Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 826.
44. Most of the prisoners' rights suits have been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970), as class actions under FED. R. Civ. PRO. 23(b) (3), with jurisdiction invoked
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) & 2201 (1970). For detailed analysis of the mechanics of
prisoners' suits see Hirschkop, Crisman & Millemann, Litigating an Affirmative
Prisoners' Rights Action, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 39 (1972) and Turner, Establishing
the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN.
L. REv. 473 (1971).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
46. 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689); 1 KENT's COMMENTARIES 606 (7th ed. 1851).
188 [VOL. 36
OVERCROWDING IN PRISONS
to the contrary, 47 the traditional view is that the intent was to prohibit
only barbarous forms of punishment such as dismemberment and torture.48
As society's prediliction for these types of punishments waned, the eighth
amendment was considered by some to be obsolete.49 However, in 1910
the Supreme Court gave the provision renewed meaning, holding in
Weems v. United States,50 "[The eighth amendment] is not fastened to
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes en-
lightened by a humane justice."51 Nearly half a century later the Court in
Trop v. Dulles52 applied the eighth amendment to invalidate a punishment
of loss of citizenship, (a punishment involving no form of physical bru-
tality). In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Warren stated, "The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."5
Having established that the basic concern of the eighth amendment
is "nothing less than the dignity of man ' 54 and that the eighth amendment
applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment,5 5 courts began
to evaluate the constitutionality of prison conditions and to recognize
that a claim of cruel and unusual punishment can be extended to prison
practices and conditions as they pertain to a class of prisoner-plaintiffs. 5
In Holt v. Sarver,57 in which the Arkansas Prison System was declared
in violation of the eighth amendment, a federal court held that
unlike earlier cases . . . which have involved specific practices and
abuses alleged to have been practiced upon Arkansas convicts, [this
case] amounts to an attack on the System itself. As far as the Court
is aware, this is the first time that convicts have attacked an entire
penitentiary system in any court, either State or federal.58
47. See Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria and the Enlightenment: An
Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment Doc-
trine, 24 BUFF. U.L. REv. 783 (1975); Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. Rzv. 839 (1969).
48. See Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 409-10, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893). For
discussion of the origins of the eighth amendment and its application see Note, The
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv.
L. REv. 635, 636-39 (1966).
49. See Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind. 404, 410, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (1893) ("[T]he
provision would seem to be wholly unnecessary in a free government, since it is
scarcely possible that any department of such a government should authorize or
justify such atrocious conduct.")
50. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The defendant had been given fifteen years at hard
labor for falsifying public documents.
51. Id. at 378.
52. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
53. Id. at 101.
54. Id. at 100.
55. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
56. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
57. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
58. Id. at 365.
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Subsequent cases have affirmed this expanded interpretation of the eighth
amendment. 59
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia"0
isolates four tests by which the applicability of the eighth amendment
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment can be determined :61
1) is the punishment degrading to the dignity of man ;62 2) is the punish-
ment severe and arbitrarily inflicted ;63 3) is the punishment unacceptable
to contemporary society ;64 and 4) is the punishment excessive, i.e., is
there a "significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the
purposes for which the punishment is inflicted." 65 These tests provide
a variety of approaches to assessing whether a prison system is uncon-
stitutional. There is, however, an inescapable element of subjectivity in
each of these tests, and what happens to be declared unconstitutional may
well depend on the personal views of individual judges. 66
59. See, e.g., James v. Wallaoe, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (denial of
defendants motion to dismiss), 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (opinion and order).
It has been recognized that the concept of "cruel and unusual punishment"
is not limited to instances in which a prisoner is subjected to individual punish-
ment or abuse.
Where conditions within a prison are such that the inmates incarcerated
therein will inevitably and necessarily become more sociopathic and less able to
adapt to conventional society as the result of their incarceration than they were
prior thereto, cruel and unusual punishment is inflicted.
382 F. Supp. at 1180-81. See also Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D.
Fla. 1975), af'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291,
1300-01 (5th Cir. 1974); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971),
enforced 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973).
60. 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972).
61. In Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889-91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dis-
senting against the denial of certiorari), three such tests were identified: 1) does
the punishment violate society's evolving standards of decency; 2) does the punish-
ment fit the crime; and 3) can the permissible aims of punishment be as effectively
achieved by a less severe alternative? In that case the petitioner was sentenced to
death after a rape conviction.
62. 408 U.S. at 271. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910).
63. 408 U.S. at 274.
64. Id. at 277. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) ; Burns v. Swenson,
430 F.2d 771, 778 (8th Cir. 1970).
65. 408 U.S. at 279. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) ; Ralph
v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970); Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127
(N.D.N.Y. 1970). In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974), the Supreme
Court stated that the legitimate purposes of a corrections system are deterrence, isola-
tion from society, rehabilitation, and discipline to maintain internal security.
66. In Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968), the court recognized
that although the limits of cruel and unusual punishment are not easily defined and
the standards are flexible, a determination of "the basic attitude of the entire [Supreme]
Court to the Eighth Amendment" can be reached by interpretation of "the totality of
the language used." Id. at 579. It would therefore appear that despite the academic
desirability of making decisions based on neutral principles, see Wechsler, Toward
[VOL. 36
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When applied to the problem of overcrowding, the eighth amend-
ment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment must be analyzed
in terms of the deprivations which are an inevitable result of overcrowding.
While courts have not yet held that a mere showing of overcrowding is
enough to establish cruel and unusual punishment, movement has been
in that direction. Some have been quick to recognize the correlation
between overcrowding and substantive deprivations.67 Many of the inci-
dents of overcrowding (e.g., uncontrolled violence, health hazards, and
inability of prison officials to provide adequate medical care) have in many
cases not specifically dealing with overcrowding been held to be uncon-
stitutional.
68
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959), eighth amend-
ment interpretation, especially when dealing with prison conditions, does not lend
itself to detached analysis. It is perhaps for this reason that a number of courts when
faced with an eighth amendment challenge to prison conditions have applied as many
tests as will fit. In Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970), it was held:
[Clonditions of plaintiffs' confinement in Orleans Parish Prison so shock the
conscience as a matter of elemental decency and are so much more cruel than is
necessary to achieve a legitimate penal aim that such confinement constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment ....
Id. at 1019 (emphasis added). Likewise in James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318, 329
(M.D. Ala. 1976), it was found, "There can be no question that the present conditions
of confinement in the Alabama penal system violate any current judicial definition
of cruel and unusual punishment . . . ." The court quoted from Trop v. Dulles, 316
U.S. 86, 101 (1958), to the effect that the eighth amendment "must draw its meaning
from evolving standards of decency," and further stated, "The conditions in which
Alabama prisoners must live ... bear no reasonable relation to legitimate institutional
goals." 406 F. Supp. at 328-29.
67. For example in James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), Judge
Johnson noted that "overcrowding is primarily responsible for and exacerbates all
the other ills of Alabama's penal system." Id. at 323. In Costello v. Wainwright,
397 F. Supp. 20, 31 (M.D. Fla. 1975), the court held:
In summary, the overwhelming evidence is that there is a direct and im-
mediate correlation between severe overcrowding, as now exists in the Florida
Prison System, and the deprivation of minimally adequate health care. In addi-
tion, it appears that severe overcrowding endangers the very lives of the inmates
because of its being a factor in the causation of violence within the prison system.
68. The following is by no means a complete listing of prison litigation. It is
merely intended to show a sampling of cases in which certain conditions (those
usually present when there is overcrowding) have been held to be in violation of
the Constitution.
Violence and physical assault by other inmates: Woodhous v. Virginia, 487
F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972);
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (Holt II) ; Holt v. Sarver, 300
F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt I); Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick,
444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971); see Belthea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir.
1969) (allegation by plaintiff inmates that they were beaten by other inmates and
then denied proper medical treatment held to raise sufficient factual issue concerning
eighth amendment violations to preclude summary judgment); cf. Penn v. Oliver,
351 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1972) (isolated instance of inmate assault is not a viola-
tion of the eighth amendment unless the assault is shown to be part of a pattern of
undisputed, unchecked violence or egregious failure to provide security). But cf.
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PRETRIAL DETENTION
In evaluating the constitutionality of pretrial detention facilities,
courts have had to rely on different constitutional reasoning. 69 Although
one might think that the eighth amendment should apply with equal force
to protect pretrial detainees from cruel and unusual punishment, many
courts have ruled that the amendment has no applicability to jail condi-
tions because pretrial detainees are not being punished, but merely de-
tained.70 The conditions of detention may well be cruel, unusual, and even
Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971) (no cause of action
against a sheriff of a local jail for sexual assaults by other inmates when it was
shown that the sheriff had done all he could to prevent homosexual rape). See
generally Plotkin, Surviving Justice: Prisoners' Rights To Be Free from Physical
Assault, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 387 (1974).
Inadequate medical care: Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla.
1974) (level of medical care in prison inadequate to meet predictable health needs is
a violation of the eighth amendment); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd in part 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948
(1975). See also Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1974); Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972) (depriving badly needed
medical care from a pretrial detainee is a violation of due process) ; McCollum v.
Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
In the following prison cases, overcrowding was seen as one of the prime
factors responsible for substandard conditions and serious eighth amendment viola-
tions. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1974);
James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976); McCray v. Sullivan, 399 F.
Supp. 271 (S.D. Ala. 1975); Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla.
1975), aff'd, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D.
Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362
(E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F.
Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970), order sub nom. Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp.
549 (E.D. La. 1972).
69. For general discussion of the rights of pretrial detainees, see Comment,
Incarcerating the Innocent: Pretrial Detention in Our Nation's Jails, 21 BUFF. U.L.
REv. 891 (1972); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial
Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941 (1970); Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79
HARv. L. REv. 1489 (1966).
70. E.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973). "We have considerable doubt that the cruel and unusual punishment clause
is properly applicable at all until after conviction and sentence." Id. at 1032. See
Tyrrell v. Taylor, 394 F. Supp. 9, 18 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp.
594, 624 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974) ; Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 688 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd 494
F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974) ; Hamilton v. Love,
328 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1971). But see Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289,
302 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Rhem v. Magrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In
Jones v. Wittenburg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99-100 (N.D. Ohio 1971), supplemental
decision 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456
F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972), the court stated that because the jail in question housed
both convicts and pretrial detainees, it could see no reason why the eighth amend-
ment protection afforded the convicts should not also apply to the detainees.
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barbaric, but, because the state has not legitimately assumed its role as
the instrument of society's punishment, the eighth amendment should not
apply. Fortunately these courts have not felt constrained by this analysis.
They have held that subjecting a pretrial detainee to overly oppressive
conditions which are in effect punitive and thus treating him as though
he were convicted is a violation of the fourteenth amendment, a deprivation
of liberty without due process of law. 7 1
Courts have recognized that a substantive due process constitutional
evaluation of jails is akin to an eighth amendment analysis, or, as stated
in Rhem v. Malcolm,72 "[A] detainee is entitled to protection from cruel
and unusual punishment at least as a matter of due process if not under
the Eighth Amendment." The legitimate state interests involved in incar-
cerating the accused are to insure his presence at trial and thereafter to
maintain internal security.73 If the restrictions placed upon him are
harsher than necessary to further these interests, then, courts have held,
there is a violation of due process.7 4
71. See cases cited note 70 supra; Inmates of Milwaukee County Jail v. Petersen,
353 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268 (D.N.H.
1972); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972). These cases are
based on a substantive due process rationale, a recognition of an individual's natural
right to be free from arbitrary invasion by the state. The Supreme Court has lately re-
lied on this concept in areas of personal liberties. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
167-71 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
502-07 (1965) (White, J., concurring) ; see note 74 infra. For exhaustive analysis
of the history of the due process clause and criticism of substantive due process, see
Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention (Part II), 60 GEo. L.J. 1382 (1972).
72. 371 F. Supp. 594, 623-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part 507 F.2d 333 (2d
Cir. 1974).
73. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[W]here
incarceration is imposed prior to conviction, deterrence, punishment, and retribution
are not legitimate functions of the incarcerating officials. Their role is but a temporary
holding operation . . . .") Id. at 190. See also Tyrrell v. Taylor, 394 F. Supp. 9, 19
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Implicit in the legitimate state interest in detaining for trial is the necessity to main-
tain security in the jail. See, e.g., Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for
Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp.
594, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974). In addition,
pretrial detention can be justified on public safety grounds in that some defendants
are too dangerous to be freed before trial. For analysis of the constitutional issues
raised by preventive detention, see Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HA.RV.
L. REv. 1489 (1966).
74. "[A]ny deprivation or restriction of the detainees' rights beyond those which
are necessary for confinement alone, must be justified by a compelling necessity."
Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397
(2d Cir. 1975). See Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
In other areas of personal liberties, courts have held that certain forms of
governmental regulation are unconstitutional if the legitimate end sought to be
achieved can be effected by a less restrictive alternative. See, e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (Warren, C.J., Goldberg & Brennan, JJ., concurring)
(state interest in safeguarding marital fidelity can be achieved by a less intrusive
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Some courts have analyzed conditions of pretrial detention by means
of various interpretations of equal protection. One theory is that if
conditions of confinement are more restrictive than necessary to insure
appearance at trial and to maintain jail security (the same criteria used in
a due process evaluation of jails) then the pretrial detainees, by comparison
to arrestees out on bail, are said to suffer an impermissible discrimination. 75
The argument as stated in Brenneman v. Madigan,76 is: "Except for the
right to come and go as he pleases, a pre-trial detainee retains all of
the rights of a bailee, and his rights may not be ignored because it is
expedient or economical to do so." The problem with this approach is
that it rests on the assumption that because both detainees and bailees
are presumed innocent they are entitled to equal treatment. 77 However,
in actuality they cannot be considered equal: one class is incarcerated,
the other is free. In effect the courts are saying that both groups should
be treated as equally as possible, considering the constraints which must
be placed on the detainees. This reasoning distorts the concept of
equality.
78
An equal protection question can also be raised by comparing treat-
ments accorded detainees and convicts. It can be said that confinement
for detainees under conditions as restrictive as those for convicts amounts
means than a statute outlawing the use of all contraceptive drugs and devices);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (desire to protect national
security can be achieved by less restrictive legislation than that which makes it a
crime for a member of a communist organization to apply for or use a passport);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (statute requiring state teachers to file an
affidavit listing all organizations to which they have belonged or contributed is too
broad to be justified by the state's legitimate interest in assuring the competence of
its teachers). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) ; Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623-25 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 788 (D.R.I. 1970).
75. See Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1975). This analysis
can be used to attack the constitutionality of bail itself in that only those who cannot
afford to pay a bailbondsman are detained and hence suffer an invidious discrimination.
See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. Rxwv. 1125 (1965).
76. 343 F. Supp. 128, 138 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
77. See Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041, 1044 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Presumed inno-
cent in the eyes of the law, [detainees] are incarcerated solely to insure their appear-
ance at subsequent proceedings").
The "presumption of innocence" is merely a shorthand expression for the
proposition that the government has the burden of proof on the issue of guilt in
criminal cases. The "presumption" cannot be used as a constitutional foundation for
pretrial detainees' rights. See Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579 (D.C. App. 1974) ;
Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Dentention (Part II), 60 GEO. L.J. 1381, 1438-39
(1972).
78. See Tyrrell v. Taylor, 394 F. Supp. 9, 19 n.30 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Note that
although there are weaknesses in this equal protection argument, if the facts of any
particular case established that pretrial detainees have suffered restrictions greater
than necessary to further legitimate state interests, then there may well be violations
of due process. See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
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to an unreasonable classification or, as stated in Hamilton v. Love,7 9 "It
is clear that the conditions for pre-trial detention must not only be equal
to, but superior to, those permitted for prisoners serving sentences for
crimes they have committed against society."80 The crux of this reason-
ing is that it can be a violation of equal protection to treat different
classes similarly. Stated in slightly different terms, inclusion of pretrial
detainees in the same class with prisoners requiring highly restrictive
confinement is unconstitutionally overinclusive; it subjects pretrial de-
tainees to conditions which the state could justify imposing only upon con-
victed prisoners.81
Some courts have modified this approach and found an equal pro-
tection violation by considering as one class all those incarcerated (de-
tainees and convicts) and concluding that if the conditions for pretrial
detainees are worse than those in local prisons, then the detainees have
been denied equal protection.8 2 This approach can be criticized in that it
logically precludes holding that conditions for pretrial detainees should
be better than those for convicts; being in the same class, they would
have to be treated equally.83 Furthermore, there are situations in which
it is unavoidable that some convicts receive better treatment than pre-
trial detainees, e.g., convicts on work release programs. To maintain
that equal protection requires equality of treatment for all those confined
is a gross oversimplification. This equal protection argument has a
certain appeal when limited to comparing deplorable jail conditions with
those in prisons, but, carried to its logical extreme - equality in all
respects - its basic fallacy becomes apparent.
79. 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971), supplemental order 358 F. Supp. 338
(E.D. Ark. 1973).
80. 328 F. Supp. at 1191. See Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 688 (D. Mass.
1973); Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268, 272 (D.N.H. 1972); Note, Constitutional
Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941, 947-50 (1970).
81. For discussion of overinclusion, see Developments in the Law - Equal Pro-
tection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1086-87 (1969).
82. See Miller v. Carson, 392 F. Supp. 515, 521 (M.D. Fla. 1975)
[A]t least 90% of the [jail] inmates . . .never leave their exceedingly cramped
ten man cells, not even to eat meals.
An additional consideration is the fact that the city defendants, by their own
testimony, provide extensive outdoor recreation at the Jacksonville Correctional
Institution, which houses sentenced prisoners. This creates a patent equal pro-
tection violation since one class of inmates incarcerated by the city defendants
is clearly being treated much more harshly than another class.
In Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971), the court held it to
be cruel and unusual punishment to confine prisoners on death row for long periods of
time without outdoor exercise.
83. See Tyrrell v. Taylor, 394 F. Supp. 9, 19 n.30 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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The problem was recognized by the court in Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Eisenstadt,8 4 where it was stated,
[S]uch an analysis can be carried too far. It does not mean that
new correctional and penal institutions may not be constructed or
old ones renovated because they might thereby become less confining
and punitive than certain decrepit detention centers within the same
system. It does mean, however, that prisoners awaiting trial . . . may
not constitutionally be made the orphans of criminal jurisprudence
whose degradation may be ignored because they are merely charged
with criminal offenses rather than found guilty of them.
The lack of consistency in the application of an equal protection
evaluation of jails adds to the confusion. For instance the court in Rhem
v. Malcolms 5 held, "the equal protection clause mandates treatment of
New York City detainees at least as favorable as that accorded New York
State prisoners, unless a rational basis for the different treatment is pro-
vided." Yet in the same opinion it was flatly stated that "a detainee may
not be confined under conditions more rigorous than a convicted pris-
oner . . . . 6 In Brenneman v. Madigan,8 7 the court concluded that
subjecting pre-trial detainees to restrictions and privations other than
those which inhere in their confinement itself or which are justified
by compelling necessities of jail administration, is a violation of the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The cases are thus unclear as to whether treating detainees more harshly
than convicts is completely prohibited, or, if sometimes acceptable, whether
by rational or compelling justification. This lack of uniformity suggests
that the courts' reasoning is motivated primarily by notions of fundamental
fairness (i.e., substantive due process) and that the rather unclear equal
protection rationale is used merely to bolster their conclusions.
The legality of overcrowded jails has also been challenged as a breach
of local, rather than constitutional, law. In Wayne County Jail Inmates v.
Wayne County Board of Commissioners88 a Michigan court found that
the overcrowded conditions in the county jail constituted a violation of
Michigan Housing Law and Michigan Corrections Department Regula-
tions. The court said that the jail should have provided at least five
hundred cubic feet of air space and at least 52 square feet of floor space
84. 360 F. Supp. 676, 688 (D. Mass. 1973).
85. 371 F. Supp. 594, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 623.
87. 343 F. Supp. 128, 142 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (emphasis added).
88. 1 Pris. L. Rptr. 51 (Cir. Ct. of Wayne Co., Mich. 1971), supplemented order,
1 Pris. L. Rptr. 186 (Cir. Ct. of Wayne Co., Mich. 1972), aff'd and remanded 391
Mich. 359, 216 N.W.2d 910 (1974). For a full discussion of this case, see Note,
Criminal Procedure - Pretrial Detainment - The Jailer's Duty to Provide Jail
Inmates "Reasonable Protection" and Facilities Conforming to State and Local
Housing Codes, 18 WAYNE L. Rlv. 1601 (1972).
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for each inmate. The jail was also in violation of the Detroit Building
Code with respect to plumbing, ventilation, heating, electrical, fire, and
sanitation requirements. In Smith v. Hongistos9 the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of California used the minimum jail
standards set by California law as criteria to establish constitutional viola-
tions in the conditions of pretrial detention in the San Francisco County
Jails.90 It was likewise held in Taylor v. Sterrett9 1 that the Texas state
jail standards provided a sufficient objective basis for assessing the quality
of the jail facilities.
REMEDIES
In most of the jail92 and prison9 3 cases discussed above, overcrowding
has been recognized as a prime factor bringing about unconstitutional
deprivations. At what point the density of any prison population be-
comes unconstitutional will depend, of course, on many factual issues.
In some cases, the conditions arising from housing two men in cells
designed for single occupancy have been held unconstitutional.9 4 In other
89. 2 Pris. L. Rptr. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
90. "Due Process requires only that lawful punishment be imposed, and when
persons are incarcerated under conditions violative of the laws of the state, the
punishment exceeds that authorized by law." Id. at 288.
91. 344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972), modified 499 F2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 983 (1975). In that case the court, relying exclusively upon
state law, granted the relief requested but declined to make any constitutional evalua-
tions. However, in dictum the court did say that the jail in question "would" constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. 344 F. Supp. at 420.
92. The following cases have dealt with overcrowding as one of many issues
raised in challenging the conditions of pretrial detention: Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F2d
1041 (2d Cir. 1975), affg 389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), on remand from 507
F2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'g in part, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), supplemental
order 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention
for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975); Valvano v. Malcolm, 18 Crim. L.
Rptr. 2394 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F. Supp. 649
(S.D. Tex. 1975); Tyler v. Percich, Civil No. 74-40-C (E.D. Mo., filed Oct.
16, 1974) ; Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass.
1973), aff'd 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974), district court
order re-affirmed 518 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1975) ; Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289
(E.D. Mo. 1973); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1973), order
358 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Holland v. Danelon, 2 Pris. L. Rptr. 375
(E.D. La. 1973); Obadele v. McAdory, 2 Pris. L. Rptr. 413 (S.D. Miss. 1973);
Smith v. Hongisto, 2 Pris. L. Rptr. 257 (N.D. Cal. 1973) ; Taylor v. Sterrett, 344
F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972), modified 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 983 (1975); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), order
330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854
(6th Cir. 1972); Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs, 391
Mich. 359, 216 N.W.2d 910 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444
Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971).
93. See cases cited at note 68 supra.
94. See, e.g., Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520
F.2d 392, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1975); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360
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instances the constitutional evaluation of overcrowding has been made
with reference to the overall "design," "normal," or ".rated" capacity
of the particular institution.95 The courts have not been quick to make
constitutional evaluations based solely on numbers. It is only when
overcrowding is the cause of deplorable or inhumane conditions or serious
deprivations that overcrowding becomes unconstitutional. Nonetheless,
having recognized the causal connection between overcrowding and un-
constitutional prison and jail conditions, courts find difficulty fashioning
a workable remedy. The problem is made more difficult in situations in
which the authorities have limited means at their disposal with which
to control institutional population. In the case of the Baltimore City
Jail the overcrowding is caused by the large number of arrestees who
cannot make bail and by the back-up of convicted prisoners for whom
no room in the state's correctional facilities can be found.9 6 City and jail
officials, having little control over these factors, are limited in their
capability to take corrective action.97 Despite the understandable practical
difficulties, judges have steadfastly held that lack of resources provides
no excuse for allowing constitutional violations to continue. 98 An impasse
results.
Rather than press for immediate solutions some courts have adopted
a remedial abstention approach: the court makes its findings, suggests
remedies, and, at least as a matter of first instance, leaves the imple-
mentation up to the legislature.99 For instance in Holt v. Sarver'0 0 a
F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
977 (1974).
95. See, e.g., James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318, 332 (M.D. Ala. 1976);
Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 38-39 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd 525 F.2d 1239
(5th Cir. 1976).
96. See text accompanying notes 15-18 stupra.
97. For discussion of Baltimore City's efforts in this area, see text accompanying
notes 125 & 131 infra. In some states, government officials have had to resort to
extraordinary means to accommodate the excess of prisoners. In Florida the Depart-
ment of Correction put up tents on an athletic field adjacent to one of its prisons.
Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20, 36 (M.D. Fla. 1975). Maryland Governor
Marvin Mandel, looking for ways quickly to increase the state's prison capacity,
recently toured an unused Navy troop carrier ship and declared that it would make
an ideal prison. If all goes as planned, the federal government will make the ship
available and it will be converted to a floating prison within a year. The [Baltimore]
Sun, May 21, 1976, § C, at 1, col. 4.
98. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); Watson v. Memphis,
373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963) ; Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp.
676, 687 (D. Mass. 1973); Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 302 (E.D. Mo. 1973) ;
Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 422 (N.D. Tex. 1972) ; Collins v. Schoonfield,
344 F. Supp. 257, 264 (D. Md. 1972) ; Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 139
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
99. For an interesting comparison of the remedial abstention approaches taken in
remedying prison conditions and in effecting school desegregation, see Comment,
Equitable Remedies Available to a Federal Court After Declaring an Entire Prison
System Violates the Eighth Amendment, 1 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 101 (1972).
100. 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt I).
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federal court found extensive eighth amendment violations due in particu-
lar to inadequate internal security and grossly overcrowded isolation
cells throughout parts of the Arkansas Prison System, but, declining to
shape any specific remedy, ordered prison officials to propose remedial
action.10 1 Insufficient change came as a result of that order, and one
year later the case was again before the district court. 102  There the
court, although finding constitutional violations, emphasized the impossi-
bility of quick solutions and gave the state further opportunity to produce
a plan for remedying the situation. 0 3 The court of appeals affirmed and
remanded for further hearing on the showing of progress.10 4
The hearings continued in Holt v. Hutto,10 5 and the matter once
again reached the court of appeals in Finney v. Arkansas Board of Cor-
rection.10 6 Although steps had been taken by constructing new barracks,
by this time serious overcrowding was a major problem. The circuit
court observed, "Moreover, relief [new construction] will apparently be
short-lived, for the testimony reveals that inmate population increases each
year.' 011 7 Hence, after over five years of litigation, the Arkansas Prison
system remained still burdened with unconstitutional overcrowding.
Many courts, particularly in the jail cases, have been far more
direct in the remedies ordered. In Jones v. Wittenberg,0 8 the court
ordered that the Lucas County [Ohio] Commissioners appropriate money
to set up a bail release program designed to screen arrestees and release
on bail those who present little risk of failing to appear at trial. 0 9 In
Valvano v. Malcolm'" the court specifically ordered immediate release
of detainees starting with those who had spent the longest time in jail
with the lowest bail until the overcrowding be alleviated. In other cases
relief has been granted in the form of ordering reduction to single-cell
101. Id. at 833-34.
102. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (Holt II).
103. Id. at 383.
104. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
105. 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
106. 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
107. Id. at 201.
108. 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), order 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971),
aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
109. 330 F. Supp. at 714. See also Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F.
Supp. 649 (S.D. Tex. 1975). For discussion of bail reform projects, see notes 129-38
and accompanying text infra.
110. 18 Crim. L. Rptr. 2394 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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occupancy,"' double-cell occupancy, 1 2 transfer to other institutions,11
and general improvement of facilities. 114
In litigation concerning the unconstitutional overcrowding in Florida's
correctional system" 5 a federal court set a time table for the reduction of
population. The court did not find it necessary to order the institution of
the specific means by which the decree was to be carried out. It merely
noted that by increased use of parole, good time credits for early release,
pretrial intervention, and leasing of additional facilities, compliance with
the order would be feasible. 11
Recently in Alabama, Federal Judge Frank M. Johnson made it
clear that continued unconstitutional overcrowding would not be toler-
ated. 117 An injunction was issued preventing the state from accepting
any new prisoners (except escapees and parole violators) into the penal
system until the population at several of the state's main correctional
facilities be reduced to design capacity." 8 Judge Johnson's opinion ended
on this rather stern note:
Let the defendant state officials now be placed on notice that failure
to comply with the minimum standards set forth in the order of this
Court ... will necessitate the closing of those several prison facilities
herein found to be unfit for human confinement.""
111. See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass.
1973), aff'd 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974). Later in
Eisenstadt, the First Circuit re-affirmed the district court's ancillary order that the
defendants continue running a bail project even after federal funding for the project
had been cut off. 518 F.2d 1241 (1st Cir. 1975). See also Detainees of Brooklyn
House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 398-99 (2d Cir. 1975).
112. See Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp. 289, 304 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
113. Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971).
114. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972), modified, 499
F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 983 (1975). See cases cited note
92 supra.
115. Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), aff'd with slight
modification 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976).
116. 397 F. Supp. at 35. Cf. Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 903-04 (N.D.
Miss. 1972), aff'd 501 F2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (district court suggests that studies to
reduce population at the Mississippi State Penitentiary should focus on transfer of pris-
oners, use of half-way houses, work release, parole, probation, and new construction).
117. James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
118. The injunction had been in effect for over four months prior to the handing
down of the opinion and order. In August 1975, Judge Johnson, together with Judge
William Brevard Hand of the Southern District of Alabama, granted the plaintiffs'
prayer for emergency interim relief. McCray v. Sullivan, Civil No. 5620-69-H (M.D.
& S.D. Ala., filed Aug. 29, 1975). The order, besides dealing with overcrowding, man-
dated improving conditions of the segregation cells; the setting up of a classification
system which would be aimed, among other objectives, at identifying those inmates
who would best benefit from alternatives to incarceration; and improving general
conditions in health, internal security, mail censorship, and physical facilities.
119. 406 F. Supp. at 331.
OVERCROWDING IN PRISONS
The Alabama approach provides an object lesson as to the ultimate
practicability of such drastic judicial relief: the problem is not solved,
it is merely shifted. The immediate result of the injunction in Alabama
has been a back-up and serious overcrowding in the state's local jails.120
If such relief were granted in Maryland to solve the overcrowding in the
state's post-trial correctional facilities, the problems now experienced by
the Baltimore City Jail and all local jails would be intolerably com-
pounded.
The solutions are obvious: either build more institutions or find
alternatives to incarceration. However, the first solution is fraught with
economic and political obstacles; the second is bound to meet with heavy
public opposition, especially in light of the fact that in Maryland already
only twenty-three percent of all convicted persons are sentenced to in-
carceration. 1 21 Despite the unpopular elements inherent in both alterna-
tives, choices must be made, if not by the legislature, then inevitably by
the courts.
Pretrial Alternatives
At the pretrial stage incarceration can be avoided in two different
ways: pretrial release and, more radically, complete diversion from the
criminal justice system. 22 The basic goals of a pretrial diversion program
are to ease the burden on overcrowded jails and court dockets and to
provide a more effective and cheaper means of rehabilitation. 123 After
120. Interview with Matthew L. Meyers of the National Prison Project [Amicus
Curiae in James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976)] in Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 15, 1976. For discussion of many of the problems that have arisen due to increased
judicial involvement in correctional affairs, see Sullivan & Tifft, Court Intervention
in Correction: Roots of Resistance and Problems of Compliance, 21 CRIME & DELIN.
213 (1975); Rubin, The Impact of Court Decisions on the Correctional Process, 20
CRIME & DraIN. 129 (1974); Comment, Judicial Intervention in Corrections: The
California Experience - An Empirical Study, 20 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 452 (1973).
121. WILNER, supra note 5, at 8, app. 10a-b; see text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
122. Rate of incarceration can also be reduced by decriminalization of "victim-
less" crimes, e.g., prostitution and possession of certain drugs. There are some
offenses, such as non-payment of alimony, for which punishment by incarceration,
although providing some degree of deterrence, seems counter-productive. Giving a
man ninety days in jail for non-support may cause him to lose his job and render
support payments even less likely to be forthcoming. As noted above, see text accom-
panying notes 7-8 supra, Maryland judges are resorting to confinement in only
twenty-three percent of convictions. Thus, from a sentencing point of view, there
has been some de facto decriminalization. Nonetheless, by legislative decriminaliza-
tion of certain offenses, the burden on court dockets can be lightened resulting in
speedier trials and consequently shorter periods of pretrial detainment.
123. For a thorough analysis of pretrial diversion see J. MULLEN, THE DILEMMA
OF DIVERSION: RESOURCE MATERIALS ON ADULT PRE-TRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAMS
(LEAA); R. NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSE-
cUTION (1974); NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER, PRETRIAL
INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: AN EVALUATION OF POLICY-RELATED RESEARCH AND
POLICYMAKER PERCEPTIONS (R. Rovner-Pieczenik, ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
PRETRIAL INTERVENTION STRATEGIES]; NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE
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arrest, candidates are screened by staff members who make a determina-
tion based on the candidate's age, sex, employment, residence, previous
record, and the crime charged.' 24 If the judge and prosecutor agree, a
speedy trial is waived and a continuance is granted while the candidate
is placed in a program of social services whereby he may receive coun-
seling, job training, remedial education or other assistance aimed at im-
proving his ability to function in society and reducing his likelihood of
becoming a chronic recidivist. Contingent upon his successful completion
of the program, all charges are dropped. In the event that the candidate
does not complete the program, he stands trial. 12 5
Despite the meritorious aims of pretrial diversion (especially that
of preventing a young first offender from having a criminal record), the
concept is not without its critics. There is some question whether the
defendant should plead guilty in order to be eligible for the program.
If such a guilty plea were required, doubt would be cast on the voluntari-
ness of the plea when the defendant's alternative is trial and possible
conviction.' 2 6  There have also been arguments that pretrial diversion
is less expensive than incarceration, but recent evaluations have shown
this claim to be unsubstantiated.12 7  Many good-risk first offenders who
CENTER, SOURCE BOOK IN PRETRIAL INTERVENTION TECHNIQUES AND ACTION PRO-
GRAMS (1974) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK]; VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PRO-
GRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (1972); Comment, Pretrial Diversion from the
Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Pre-
trial Diversion].
124. The principal criteria may differ depending upon the program. For a descrip-
tion of the various types of programs, see SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, at 16-55.
125. Baltimore now has one pretrial diversion project, the Pretrial Intervention
Program, which provides counseling and remedial education services for juveniles aged
15-17. Project FOUND, a program which offered similar services for the 18-26 age
group, was discontinued in mid-1976 due to lack of local funding. The [Baltimore]
Sun, Apr. 24, 1976, § B, at 1, col. 4.
126. See Comment, Pretrial Diversion, supra note 123, at 833-34; SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 123, at 96-97, This fear is well expressed in N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT 10-11 (1974).
"The guilty we convict; the innocent we divert and supervise." Such is the
coercive threat of trial, the pain of detention, the delays, the fears and uncertain-
ties of punishment, that diversionary processes prove compelling for all but the
most determinedly innocent or the most experienced in crime.
In the Baltimore pretrial diversion project for adults, Project FOUND, no
guilty plea was required. The program, though no longer operational, see note 125
supra, apparently was so popular that there was in fact a waiting list of people who
had not even been arrested but who nevertheless wished to take part in the project's
educational program. Interview with Joseph Baum, Director of Project FOUND, in
Baltimore, Jan. 7, 1976.
127. See Comment, Pretrial Diversion, supra note 123, at 849; Statement of
Daniel J. Freed, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, on H.R. 9007 and S. 798 -
Pretrial Diversion - Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Adminis-
tration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 3-4
(1974). One study concluded that to date any cost-benefit analysis is likely to be
fraught with so many subjective issues of philosophy and morality of pretrial diversion
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are placed on pretrial diversion are unlikely to face imprisonment anyway,
and thus the state ends up incurring an additional expense by paying
for their participation in the program. In addition, there is one funda-
mental concern: widespread use of diversion, while less onerous than
prison, may increase the state's control and supervision over many more
people without a determination of guilt. 128 But whatever faults pretrial
diversion may have, its problems can perhaps be minimized by careful
analysis of the pilot programs now in operation. Moreover, given the
crisis proportions of the current and projected overcrowding problem,
reform programs such as pretrial diversion must be undertaken.
Less radical than diversion is a pretrial release program. Under such
a project, arrestees are screened and staff members make recommenda-
tions as to bail reduction or release on recognizance. 129 In fashioning
remedies for jail overcrowding some courts have ordered that pretrial
release programs be established. 80  In Baltimore the Pretrial Release
Services of the Supreme Bench has been active for several years in
helping to control the overcrowding at the Baltimore City Jail. 131 Studies
made of various pretrial release projects indicate that an increase
in the number of people released before trial does not pose an increased
danger to the community; that is, there appears to be a low statistical
probability that persons released on their own recognizance through a
pretrial release project will be re-arrested during their freedom.3 2 Also,
through such projects, the incidence of those failing to appear at trial
did not increase. 3 This would tend to indicate that pretrial detention
as to make it imprecise at best. PRETRIAL INTERVENTION STRATEGIES, supra note 123,
at 102. See also Nelson, Cost Benefit Analysis and Alternatives to Incarceration, 39
FED. PROB. 45 (Dec. 1975).
128. See note 126 supra.
129. For an examination of various bail reform projects, see P. WicE, BAIL AND
ITS REFORM: A NATIONAL SURVEY (LEAA 1973); VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (1972); Comment, Pretrial Release of an
Accused in Ohio - A Proposed Revision of Ohio Bail Laws, 41 U. CINN. L. REy.
423 (1972); Comment, Pretrial Release Under California Penal Code Section 853.6:
An Examination of Citation Release, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1339 (1972); Wice & Simon,
Pretrial Release: A Survey of Alternative Practices, 34 FED. PROD. 60 (Dec. 1970).
130. See notes 108-10 and accompanying text supra.
131. In February 1975 the population of the Baltimore City Jail reached 1,875,
capacity being approximately 1,200. Mayor Schaefer instituted an emergency ninety-
day program to reduce the population, and, among other measures, he stepped up the
activities of the Pretrial Release Division. Friedman interview, supra note 4.
132. See Gottfredson, An Empirical Analysis of Pretrial Release Decisions, 2 J.
CRIM. JusT. 287 (1974). In Note, Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6
HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIr. L. REV. 300, 317-23 (1971), it was also found that the in-
cidence of crimes committed while on bail is low.
133. In Wice & Simon, Pretrial Release: A Survey of Alternative Practices, 34
FED. PROD. 60, 62-63 (Dec. 1970), a study was reported in which the no-show rate
actually dropped, even after a nearly four-fold increase in the percentage of release
on recognizance. See also O'Rourke & Salem, A Comparative Analysis of Pretrial
Release Procedures, 14 CRIME & DELiN. 367 (1968).
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and bail are perhaps overused and unnecessary for many people. 18 4 If
these studies are accurate, then more of society's resources, whether by
community initiative,135 court order, 136 or legislation, ought to be focused
on the development of these alternatives to incarceration at the pretrial
stage to insure fairer treatment of the accused 13 7 and to help alleviate
the oppressive, potentially unconstitutional treatment of pretrial de-
tainees.138 Still the primary cause of overcrowding in Maryland's jails
is the back-up from the state's post-conviction correctional facilities, and
relief there seems to be the most effective way to ease pressures at the
pretrial stage.
Post Trial Alternatives
Penitentiaries developed in the early nineteenth century in this
country as a reform measure - an experiment to find more humane ways
of dealing with criminal offenders. 139 The basic idea was to isolate the
prisoner from all corrupting influences and establish a disciplined routine
134. A recent survey of the Baltimore City Jail showed that there were 654
"counts" at the jail for which bail had been set at less than $1,000. Letter from
Richard W. Friedman, Director of the Mayor's Coordinating Council on Criminal
Justice, to Michael A. Millemann, Jan. 22, 1976 (on file at the Maryland Law Review).
There are of course many instances in which one inmate has more than one count
against him; figures are as yet unavailable as to how many individual detainees are held
for under $1,000 bail. But if there are a substantial number of one-count detainees,
this, taken with the fact that the going rate for bailbondsmen is ten percent, means
that those people remain in jail simply because they cannot raise one hundred dollars.
135. The effectiveness of Baltimore's pretrial release program could perhaps be
augmented by increased participation of community organizations. Under Maryland
District Court Rule 777(c) (1) (a) the judicial officer making the bail determination
can "place the defendant in the custody of a designated person or organization agreeing
to supervise him and assist in assuring his appearance at court . . . ." Thus the adminis-
tration of a pretrial release program in Maryland need not be strictly a govern-
mental function.
136. See notes 108-18 and accompanying text supra.
137. See note 30 supra.
138. One largely administrative problem is that in the past judges of the Supreme
Bench of Baltimore City have taken their six week vacations each year at some
point during the summer resulting in a drastic slow-down of the judicial process
during these months. This has been somewhat alleviated recently by the coordination
of vacation schedules and by arrangements to use visiting judges from nearby coun-
ties, but a substantial summer slow-down remains. Friedman interview, supra note 4.
In a recent decision, Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 345 A.2d 62 (1975), the
Maryland Court of Appeals ordered that a defendant convicted of robbery with a
deadly weapon be released and the indictment dismissed because his trial had been
delayed for over a year due to scheduling problems and an overcrowded court docket.
This reflects a growing recognition of a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy
trial which will perhaps result in greater efforts to reduce the length of a defendant's
pretrial detention.
139. See generally G. DEBEAUIMoNT & A. DETocQuEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE (F. Lieber transl.
1833) [hereinafter cited as DEBEAUMONT & DETOcQUEVILLE]; Rothman, The Invention
of the Penitentiary, 8 Ciim. L. BULL. 555 (1972).
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intended to rehabilitate. Prisons were designed to provide an environ-
ment conducive to restoring social values which had been ruined by
society's evils. It was felt that separation of the inmates from each
other was crucial to the success of this plan.140
Although conceived with good intentions and high aspirations, the
experiment has become a monstrous failure in terms of recidivism,
rehabilitation, and human dignity. Prisons are, by and large, rarely bene-
ficial to prisoners. 141 Length of sentence has little effect on recidivism ;142
judicial sentencing decisions are often disparate in similar factual situa-
tions, 143 and convicts rarely serve their full sentences anyway.144 Given
the ineffectiveness of present sentencing, the National Council of Crime
and Delinquency advocates strict statutory control of sentence length and
further suggests that use of prisons should be limited only to those who
must, for public safety, be incarcerated. 145 This position is embodied in
its Model Sentencing Act which would limit the use of long-term in-
carceration to those considered dangerous, i.e., assaultive offenders with
personality disorders and those deeply involved with organized crime. 14
140. In 1831, Alexis deTocqueville and Gustave deBeaumont came to the United
States to study American prisons on behalf of the French government. Writing about
the objectives of penitentiaries, they made the following observation:
There are similar punishments and crimes called by the same name, but there are
not two beings equal in regard to their morals; and every time that convicts are
put together, there exists necessarily a fatal influence of some upon others,
because, in the association of the wicked, it is not the less guilty who act upon
the more criminal, but the more depraved who influence those who are less so.
We must therefore . . . come to a separation of all.
DEBEAUMONT & DETocQUEVILLE, supra note 139, at 55.
141. See K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 71-81 (1969).
142. See Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform,
35 PuB. INT. 22, 36-38 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Martinson].
143. See generally JUSTICE IN SENTENCING: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SENTENCING INSTITUTE FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CIRCUITS
(L. Orland & H. Tyler eds. 1974); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITH-
OUT ORDER (1973); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIM. JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GoALS, CORRECTIONS 142 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS); Palmer, A Model
of Criminal Dispositions: An Alternative to Official Discretion in Sentencing, 62 GEo.
L.J. 1 (1973); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing
Process, 75 HARV. L. REv. 904 (1962).
144. See CORRECTIONS, supra note 143, at 144 (table indicating the differences
between sentence imposed and actual time served by prisoners released for the first
time on current sentences).
145. Board of Directors, Nat'l Council on Crime and Delinquency, The Nondan-
gerous Offender Should Not Be Imprisoned: A Policy Statement, 19 CRIME & DELIN.
449 (1973). There is also sentiment that prison construction should be halted until
alternatives to incarceration are more fully explored. See Board of Trustees, Nat'l
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Institutional Construction: A Policy Statement,
18 CRIME & DELIN. 331 (1972). A similar policy recommending a halt in jail con-
struction was issued by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals. See CORRECTIONS, supra note 143, at 114.
146. COUNCIL OF JUDGES OF THE NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,
THE MODEL SENTENCING ACT (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MSA]. For analysis
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The adoption of such sentencing scheme in Maryland could help
ease overcrowding as well as remove some of the unfairness that defend-
ants experience in sentencing decisions, but numerous problems would
nevertheless remain. The criteria for determining dangerousness cannot
be sharply defined. 147 It is very difficult to predict future behavior, or, as
stated by Professor Marvin Wolfgang:
Anyone who asserts that science has the tools to predict violent
criminal behavior from the population at large has not adequately
considered the problems of computing mathematical probabilities, the
imprecision of our diagnostic instruments, the consequences of in-
vasion of privacy if psychiatric and psychological tests were given
to the entire population for such purposes. The infrequency of re-
corded instances of criminally violent behavior combined with our
low level of accurately predicting it would produce an enormous
number of false positives because of the propensity for overpredic-
tion. Civil and other rights of the false positives relative to any
intervention by society before a crime occurred could be staggering. 14
Furthermore, for the non-dangerous offender, the Model Sentencing Act
would give the judge discretion to impose probation, suspended sentence,
fine, restitution, or a term of incarceration not to exceed five years.
1 49
This discretionary power to incarcerate, although limited to a five-year
term, could nevertheless be frequently exercised without consideration
being given to alternatives to incarceration.
Other safeguards are necessary to insure a consistent, sensible ap-
proach to sentencing. Illinois now has under consideration a proposed
sentencing act which encompasses the concept of de-emphasis on incar-
of the Model Sentencing Act see Flood, The Model Sentencing Act: A Higher Level
of Penal Law, 9 CRIME & DELIN. 370 (1963) ; Rubin, The Model Sentencing Act, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 251 (1964). The act provides for a mandatory life sentence for first
degree murder (MSA § 7) and a term of not more than thirty years for the dan-
gerous offender (MSA § 5). See also Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions:
An Alternative to Official Discretion in Sentencing, 62 GEO. L.J. 1 (1973).
Other legislative models have also advocated limiting the use of long term
incarceration to dangerous offenders. See ABA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING
AND REVIEW, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
§§ 2.1, 2.5 (Approved Draft, 1968) ; MODEL PENAL CODE - SENTENCING PROVISIONS
§ 7.03 (1963) ; CORRECTIONS, supra note 143, at 150-57. See also O'Leary, Gottfredson
& Gelman, Contemporary Sentencing Proposals, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 555 (1975).
147. See Ginsberg & Klockars, "The Dangerous Offender" and Legislative Reform,
10 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 167 (1974).
148. Wolfgang, Violence and Its Relation to Sentencing, 46 F.R.D. 533, 551
(1968). See also N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 62-73 (1974); Wenk,
Robison & Smith, Can Violence be Predicted?, 18 CRIME & DELIN. 393 (1972). But
see Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18
CRIME & DELIN. 371 (1972) (asserting that dangerousness can be reliably diagnosed).
149. MSA, supra note 146, at § 9. See also Hickey & Rubin, Suspended Sen-
tences and Fines, 3 CRIME & DELIN. LIT. 413 (1971); Note, Creative Punishment:
A Study of Effective Sentencing Alternatives, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 57 (1975).
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ceration and provides that sentences be predictable and reviewable.150
The act would drastically narrow present judicial discretion in sentencing
and provide a routine procedure of sentence review to make sure that
there is state-wide uniformity. 151 There would also be an upgrading of
presentence investigations. 162 Judges would be provided with detailed
background information on each offender and suggestions as to which
rehabilitation programs might be suitable for him. The anticipated result
is that judges, once given this individualized report, will turn to incar-
ceration only as a last resort.
Some of the most frequently mentioned alternatives to incarceration
are the imposition of fines,'15 victim restitution, 54 and various types of
community based facilities,155 such as those recently authorized for con-
struction in Maryland.'", The imposition of monetary penalties, although
suitable in some instances,' 5 7 would have to be applied cautiously. If
the offender is too poor to pay the fine (and especially if non-payment
results in confinement) little is gained by imposition of the fine.158 The
150. See ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION, SYNOPSIS - JUSTICE MODEL
LEGISLATION (1975) ; text accompanying note 171 infra.
151. Although Maryland law provides for appellate review of sentencing, the
current procedure does not lend itself to statewide uniformity. Instead of having one
central reviewing board, sentences in each circuit can be reviewed by a board of three
judges of that circuit. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645JA-JG (1976).
152. Maryland recently enacted a statute making presentence investigations man-
datory. See [1976] Laws of Md., ch. 118, § 1, to be codified in art. 41, § 124(c) of
the Maryland Code. The statute does not specify what should be in the presentence
investigation report nor the weight to be given it by the court. Whether this law will
have a substantial impact on sentencing practices in Maryland remains to be seen.
153. See MSA, supra note 146, at § 9; ABA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING
AND REVIEW, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES
§ 2.7 (Approved Draft, 1968); MODEL PENAL CODE - SENTENCING PROVISIONS § 7.02
(1963); CORRECTIONS, supra note 143, at 162. See also Hickey & Rubin, Suspended
Sentences and Fines, 3 CRIME & DELIN. LIT. 413 (1971); Note, The Use of the Fine
as a Criminal Sanction in New Jersey: Some Suggested Improvements, 28 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1185 (1975); Note, Creative Punishment: A Study of Effective Sentencing
Alternatives, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 57 (1975).
154. See Galaway & Hudson, Restitution and Rehabilitation: Some Central
Issues, 18 CRIME & DELIN. 403 (1971). See also Fogel, Galaway & Hudson, Restitu-
tion in Criminal Justice: A Minnesota Experiment, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 681 (1972).
155. See Klapmuts, Community Alternatives to Prison, 5 CRIME & DELIN. LIT.
305 (1973).
156. [1976] Laws of Md., ch. 234, §§ 1-3, to be codified in art. 27, §§ 706-10E
of the Maryland Code. The new law is a revision of earlier community corrections
legislation which proved ineffective. The old version permitted localities to veto any
proposed community facility construction [Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 464 (repealed
1976) ] with the result that few community corrections centers were ever built. The
new version removes this veto power.
157. Monetary penalties are perhaps most appropriate when the offender has re-
ceived a pecuniary gain from his crime and the court feels that a fine would serve as an
adequate deterrent. See MODEL PENAL CODE - SENTENCING PROVISIONS § 7.02 (1963).
158. Indeed, there may well be constitutional problems. See Tate v. Short, 401
U.S. 395 (1971) ; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (both cases holding it to
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community based corrections centers may, however, be a more satisfac-
tory alternative. The goal of the community based facility is to provide
the offender with the maximum possible contact with the resources of his
community. Ideally, the centers would be relatively small (no more than
one hundred) and not house anyone who might be considered dangerous
to the community.15 9 Such facilities would constitute a reasonable alter-
native between the extremes of lenient probation and harsh sentencing.
The convict would have necessary restrictions on his freedom, be pro-
vided with a program of counseling and training, and, possibly, hold a
job in the community.
These alternatives to incarceration, however, probably will be of
little help in relieving prison overcrowding. Fines are not always a satis-
factory alternative, 160 and community corrections centers are not intended
to absorb excess prison population. 6 ' There was a fear that judges would
begin to sentence offenders to community corrections in instances in which
they previously would have given probation. 162 This would result in
rapid overcrowding of the community facilities. The newly passed legis-
lation attempts to preclude this by requiring, as a precondition of admission
to a community corrections center, that the offender's presentence investi-
gation report recommend community corrections and that the offender be
accepted by the director of the center.' 63
Attention should also be given to programs which facilitate a con-
vict's early release, provided of course that such release poses no threat
to society. 64 The most important change must come in the area of
be a denial of equal protection to incarcerate someone for non-payment of a fine
solely by reason of his indigency). See also CORRECTIONS, supra note 143, at 162-65;
Note, Fining the Indigent, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1971); Note, The Use of the
Fine as a Criminal Sanction in New Jersey: Some Suggested Improvements, 28
RUTGERS L. REv. 1185 (1975).
159. See generally GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIs-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, STATE OF MARYLAND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT: ANALYSIS OF
COMPREHENSIVE PLANS TO DEVELOP A STATEWIDE COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS SYSTEM
(1973) ; WILNFER, supra note 5.
160. See text accompanying notes 157-58 supra.
161. Chief Legislative Officer Alan M. Wilner in his report to the Maryland
General Assembly stated that community facilities
will in no way permit the State to "clean out" the prisons .... [W]e are facing
a serious crisis of overcrowding in our correctional institutions which the de-
velopment of community facilities will not, in the short run, even begin to solve.
WILNER, supra note 5, at 3.
162. Id. at 33.
163. [1976] Laws of Md., ch. 234, § 2, to be codified in the Maryland Code at
art. 27, § 710C. The statute also allows an incarcerated inmate to be transferred to
a community facility if he had been a resident of the center's county or region at the
time of his arrest, plans to return there, his remaining sentence is less than six months,
and, if convicted of a crime of violence, he is accepted by the center's director.
164. For discussion of the problems involved with predicting future criminal be-
havior, see text accompanying notes 147-48 supra.
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parole. Parole developed as a humanitarian response to the hardships of
long sentences, but the process as it has developed often frustrates and
humiliates prisoners.165 Because of the existence of parole, judges fre-
quently sentence in excess of what might be termed "fair" because they
take into account the possibility of early release.' 66 Furthermore the deci-
sion to grant or deny parole is supposed to be based on whether the
inmate has been sufficiently rehabilitated by his stay in prison.167 More
often, however, eligibility for parole is determined not by degree of re-
habilitation, (if such a determination can accurately be made 168 ) but by
the passage of time, i.e. serving a specified ration of the sentence. 69
The central feature in most suggestions for parole reform is a re-
moval of discretion. 170 Some approaches have advocated completely
abolishing parole and replacing it with fixed, "flat-time" sentences, which
can be shortened by the inmate's good behavior ("good time")1 71 The
judge would set the sentence in accordance with legislative guidelines
without having to take into account the unpredictable, discretionary deci-
sions of some future parole board. The offender would know his release
date and know that he can shorten his stay in prison, not by wooing a
parole board, but by good and lawful behavior. 172 The resulting shorter
sentences should help reduce prison population.
165. See generally Comment, Curbing Abuse in the Decision to Grant or Deny
Parole, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REv. 419 (1973).
166. CORRECTIONS, supra note 143, at 146.
167. See generally CITIZENS' INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC.,
PRISON WITHOUT WALLS: REPORT ON NEW YORK PAROLE (1975).
168. See R. GOLDFAR & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 278-82 (1973).
169. Comment, Curbing Abuse in the Decision to Grant or Deny Parole, 8 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 419, 423 (1973).
170. For analysis of present parole practices and suggestions for reform, see
CITIZENS' INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INC., PRISON WITHOUT
WALLS: REPORT ON NEW YORK PAROLE (1975); Parole Release Decisionmaking and
the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810 (1975); Comment, Curbing Abuse in the
Decision to Grant or Deny Parole, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 419 (1973).
See also O'Leary & Nuffield, A National Survey of Parole Decision-making, 19
CRIME & DELIN. 378 (1973); Palmer, A Model of Criminal Dispositions: An Alter-
native to Official Discretion in Sentencing, 62 GEO. L.J. 1 (1973).
171. See ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION, SYNOPSIS - JUSTICE MODEL
LEGISLATION (1975).
172. A relatively new concept, adopted by the Maryland Division of Correction
and the Parole Board is the so-called MAP (Mutual Agreement Programming). It
works on a contract concept: a plan is negotiated with each eligible inmate whereby
he is given several objectives (e.g., education, skill training, work assignment, treat-
ment, and behavior). If he lives up to the goals, the state is obliged to release him on
the agreed upon date. See MAP COORDINATOR, MARYLAND DIviSION OF CORRECTION,
MARYLAND MODEL - MUTUAL AGREEMENT PROGRAMMING (July 1974). The result
is to speed up rehabilitation by incentives, reduce discretionary decision making, and
shorten sentence length.
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CONCLUSION
As noted above, a de-emphasis on the use of incarceration must be
accompanied by an increase in the capacity of correctional institutions
in order to deal with overcrowding. Construction as now planned in
Maryland will, however, only add some 1,300 beds over the next five
to six years, while the projected prison population could increase by
5,000.173 If plans were changed to meet this population explosion, it is
estimated that the extra cost of construction would amount to $23 mil-
lion.174 It is beyond the scope of this comment to analyze the fiscal
problems involved in planning such a massive building program. In any
event it is unlikely to be undertaken in time to provide any significant
remedy to the current crisis.
Maryland has, by necessity, limited the use of post-conviction in-
carceration so that roughly only one out of every five convicts is im-
prisoned, yet the rise in the prison population is out of control. Under-
mining the entire philosophy of corrections are the disturbing conclusions
of recent research that there is very little that any rehabilitative program
can do to reduce recidivism.1 75  The failure of rehabilitative programs
suggests that criminal behavior cannot be treated as a disease.175 Crime
can be viewed as a social phenomenon: a necessary result of a complex
of social, moral, and legal factors ;177 our failure to understand and to deal
with these factors is demonstrated by the overcrowded prisons. By in-
creased use of pretrial diversion and pretrial release, restrictions on
judicial discretion in sentencing, use of alternatives to incarceration (or
shorter fixed sentences) for the non-dangerous offender, limiting the
use of long-term incarceration to dangerous criminals, and re-evaluating
parole procedures, we might reduce jail and prison populations and
perhaps accomplish as much as any penal system can with a minimum of
suffering.
But these suggestions must be considered in light of public opinion.
Many citizens are firm in their conviction that the threat of incarceration
173. WILNER, supra note 5, at app. 5.
174. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERv., THE POPULATION PROBLEM
IN CORRECTIONS AND APPROACHES TO SOLUTION 14 (Aug. 1975).
175. See Martinson, supra note 142; Adams, Some Findings From Correctional
Caseload Research, 31 FED. PROB. 48 (Dec. 1967). See also Bailey, Correctional
Outcome: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 153 (1966).
176. See Martinson, supra note 142, at 49-50.
177. Crime reflects more than the character of the pitiful few who commit it.
It reflects the character of the entire society. How do people capable of stealing
a car or mugging a cripple, of embezzling from the bank that trusted them or
raping an eighty-year-old woman, come to be that way? All they are and all they
have experienced that drove them to commit that crime overcame all that sought
in vain to restrain them. What they are and what they experienced came largely
from society - from its influence on them and on their forebears.
P- CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 17 (1970).
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is absolutely necessary for its deterrent effect.178 No one can ignore the
overwhelming public sentiment, motivated by real fear, that more, not
fewer, should be locked up. The pervasive demands for "law and order"
and "getting tough" with crime appear to be incompatible with penal
reform aimed at restricting the use of incarceration. Nonetheless, some
state prison systems are being forced by federal courts to reduce prison
populations. State legislatures are caught between these conflicting forces.
By taking the initiative to institute widespread reforms in pretrial proce-
dures and sentencing practices, despite public opposition, states can im-
prove prison conditions while preserving autonomy over their own cor-
rectional systems.
178. See Connolly, The Possibility of a Prison Sentence Is a Necessity, 21 CRIME
& DELIN. 356 (1975). But see THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
& ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 16 (1967):
Deterrence - both of people in general and offenders as potential recidivists -
and, where necessary control remain legitimate correctional functions. Unfor-
tunately there has been little attempt to investigate by research and evaluation of
the extent to which various methods of handling offenders succeed in these respects.
See also K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 206 (1969). ("[T]he equivocal
justification of deterrence . . . is a weak and vulnerable argument indeed, for the
effects of punishment in this direction cannot be demonstrated by sound evidence
or research.").
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